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CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN MORAL 
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By Frances Myrna Kamm.1 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 227. 
Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.95. 
Susan M. Wo/f2 
In 1971 Judith Jarvis Thomson published a now-famous article 
on abortion.J In it she argued that even if the fetus were a person, 
abortion would be morally permissible in some cases. She did so 
using the hypothetical case of a famous violinist with a severe kid-
ney ailment, who required nine months of attachment to a specific 
person's circulatory system to avoid death. The Society of Music 
Lovers kidnapped the needed person and attached the violinist. 
Thomson maintained that the violinist's need to use the other's 
body did not create a right, and that the latter or a third party could 
permissibly remove him. 
Frances Kamm, writing almost exactly twenty years later, 
picks up where Thomson left off. She too proceeds from the as-
sumption that the fetus is a person, and then uses hypothetical cases 
(starting with the violinist) to offer somewhat different arguments 
that abortion would be permissible, though not in all cases. She 
further considers the morality of conception and responsibilities in 
pregnancy devolving on those who do not abort, touching upon re-
lated topics more briefly. 
Kamm offers a densely written and challenging book, with in-
tricate and often ingenious arguments. Indeed, those who do not 
practice this kind of analytic philosophy may well find it slow go-
ing. The author rarely pauses to reframe her argument in more ac-
cessible terms. 4 It may help, then, to offer here a fuller summary 
than usual, even if it inevitably does some violence to an argument 
that hinges on detailed analysis of myriad hypotheticals. 
The goal of Creation and Abortion is limited. Kamm aims to 
show that even if the fetus is assumed to be a person, it is plausible 
1. Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Minnesota. This review 
was written while a 1992-93 Fellow in the Program in Ethics and the Professions, Harvard 
University. The reviewer thanks Arthur Applbaum, Larry Blum, Dan Brock, Norman Dan-
iels, Rebecca Dresser, Jorge Garcia, Dennis Thompson and Alan Wertheimer for helpful 
suggestions. None of them is responsible for views expressed herein. 
3. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in William Parent, ed., Rights, Resti-
tution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 1 (Harv. U. Press, 1986), reprinting 1 Philosophy & 
Pub. Affairs 47 (1971). 
4. I should note that Thomson's piece, in contrast, is quite accessible. 
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to believe that many abortions are morally permissible. She does 
not seek to persuade us that such abortions are in fact morally per-
missible, but merely that it is plausible to believe so. Then, given 
our society's commitment to liberalism, we should be able to agree 
that it is morally permissible to allow those abortions. 5 
Her overall strategy is to present an argument that abortions 
are permissible, and then to show that the argument is plausible by 
applying and refining it in hypothetical cases. The demonstration 
uses her intuitions about those cases and appeals to ours. As part of 
that appeal to intuitions, her moral approach is nonconsequential-
ist, which she claims is the approach that most of us actually take.6 
She pursues this strategy with three major related arguments. 7 
She starts with an argument for the permissibility of detaching a 
dependent person in nonabortion cases such as the case of Thom-
son's violinist. She then adapts that argument for abortion cases. 
Finally, she offers an argument that considers what burdens a vol-
untary creator of fetal life would have to bear in order to provide 
the fetus a minimum of life and health, and reconciles the obligation 
to bear some burdens with the permissibility of abortion. 
Kamm labels the first of these arguments the "output cutoff 
argument," because the argument concerns the question of when 
can the person to whom the violinist is attached, or a third party, 
cut off the relevant "output"-the benefit of life that the violinist is 
enjoying due to the support. This argument becomes the founda-
tion for her approach throughout the book.s It has five steps. 
Step 1 is that the violinist's "need to have your body ... does 
not confer [a] right .... " This is a point that Thomson also devel-
oped. She argued that even if the touch of Henry Fonda would 
magically save you from death, you do not therefore have a right to 
his touch, or to have him brought to your bedside. 
With Step 2 Kamm begins to depart from Thomson. Kamm 
argues that the supporter has no special obligation to render or con-
5. Kamm states that the point of her section on liberalism is "to suggest that we need 
do no more than show that permissible abortion is one morally reasonable option.'' 
6. Kamm explains that "[n]onconsequentialism does not ignore consequences ... , it 
merely claims that factors other than consequences matter." For her more recent discussion 
of nonconsequentialism, see F.M. Kamm, Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-
Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 Philosophy & Pub. Affairs 354 (1992). 
7. Kamm also considers a fourth very briefly, the "immigration argument," maintain-
ing that "abortion is permissible because creators owe to new persons still in the womb less 
than they owe to other people." This argument analogizes fetuses to immigrants who are not 
yet citizens. 
8. Though the third major argument, the "benefit-burden approach," is initially 
presented as an alternative if the "output cutoff argument" for abortion is found inadequate, 
Kamm subsequently links the two and states that the latter argument "still provides the 
structure for this new approach." 
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tinue the support, even if she volunteered for attachment or engaged 
in acts that foreseeably resulted in attachment.9 Intentionally or 
foreseeably starting to give support does not preclude a later conclu-
sion that support is too onerous. In effect, the support is given in 
installments, and you can decide to refrain from making the next 
one. There is one exception: if your volunteering meant that the 
violinist was not plugged into someone else who might have sup-
ported him. 
The third step is by far the most complex. Here the argument 
is that detaching the violinist does not harm him relative to the op-
portunities he would have had if attachment had never occurred 
(what Kamm calls "preattachment opportunities"). If attachment 
had never occurred, he would be dead. Thus detachment (and en-
suing death) robs him of nothing he would have had without your 
support, support to which he had no right (by Step 1) and which 
you have no special duty to give (by Step 2). Note that the violinist 
is harmed relative to his prospects once you have started support, 
and relative to his prospects if you were to complete all nine 
months. But the argument is that the correct base line for compari-
son is the condition in which he would have been without the sup-
port at all (that is, dead), since he never had a right to that support 
in the first place. 
Step 4 is that the efforts involved in supporting the violinist are 
burdensome enough so that they can justify killing the violinist to 
stop those efforts. This step involves attending to the higher justifi-
cation required for killing rather than allowing someone to die. w 
Here Kamm emphasizes that the burden of support is not just a 
matter of its strenuousness, but also reflects the special onerousness 
of bodily invasions, especially "sexualized" ones. This helps estab-
lish the permissibility of the supporter or a third party actively kill-
ing the violinist, rather than just waiting for the means of 
attachment to fall out. 
Finally, Step 5 requires that killing the violinist is the only way 
to end his imposition that is not excessively costly to you. In other 
words, if his imposition upon you could be ended without killing 
him, then killing him might not be permissible. The significance of 
this step is best understood through its later development in the 
9. Thomson was Jess definite in her conclusions here, arguing that engaging in acts 
foreseeably resulting in attachment might make detachment impermissible in some cases, but 
deciding largely to "side-step this issue" in the context of her own argument. Thomson, A 
Defense of Abortion at 12 (cited in note 3). 
10. It is a strength of this book, in my view, that it defends a moral distinction between 
the two practices, at a time when a number of the proponents of active euthanasia are arguing 
that there is none. 
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abortion context. There it opens up the long-debated question of 
whether a right to choose abortion implies a right to thwart the 
fetus's or child's continuation oflife outside the body, in an artificial 
womb (were we to invent them) or the body of another. Kamm 
argues that the permissibility of detaching the violinist or fetus does 
not entitle the ex-supporter to thwart other means of support. For 
Kamm, this also helps explain the significance of viability. Once 
the fetus can live outside the womb, albeit with mechanical support, 
it is no longer permissible to kill it through the process of abortion, 
because that would deprive the fetus of life it could have indepen-
dently of the woman. 
When Kamm turns in chapter four to direct consideration of 
abortion, she uses this same five-step argumentative structure, but 
refines it for fetuses. Step 3 remains pivotal. Here Kamm argues 
that the proper base line for comparison in assessing harm to the 
fetus is its state if support had never begun. Yet here that state is 
not death, as in the case of the violinist, but preconception nonexis-
tence. Thus the argument is that the fetus has not been harmed 
relative to "pre-attachment prospects" or nonexistence. Kamm ad-
mits that there are "obvious problems" with using nonexistence as a 
basis for comparison. But she suggests that we already do so, to 
some extent, when we ask whether further life for someoneu is 
worse than the nonexistence of death. I return below to the prob-
lem of using preconception nonexistence as a base line. 
Chapter five adds a new dimension, by considering that a vol-
untary creator may have an obligation to do more than just make 
sure the fetus is no worse off than if it never existed. On the as-
sumption that the fetus is a person, its creator may be obliged to try 
to ensure some "minima" in terms of "number of years of life with 
some degree of health and welfare." The question then is how far 
must the creator go to secure those minima, when must pregnancy 
be completed to supply them, and when should a person abstain 
from creating because the minima will not be provided. 
Kamm's approach is to compare the benefits and burdens to 
fetus and creator. In order to obtain the benefit of life, it is reason-
able for the fetus to bear some risk of being harmed or aborted, 
according to Kamm. Put another way, given our "strong reasons to 
reproduce, demanding complete security for the fetus seems unrea-
sonable." Otherwise, in order to provide complete security the cre-
ator would have to bear the cost of avoiding all conception 
("abstinence" costs), or would have to carry the fetus to term ("car-
II. An example might be a person on a ventilator for whom there is a question of 
whether to terminate the life-sustaining treatment. 
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riage" costs) and undergo bodily invasion if needed for the fetus's 
health ("surgery" costs). Voluntary creators should try to secure 
the minima, but generally need not bear costs equal to those three. 
However, Kamm shows that the precise level of cost that should be 
borne will vary, depending on the circumstances. 
Kamm's final chapter takes up three abortion-related topics. 
First she considers "informed consent" requirements mandating 
that a woman who is considering abortion be told "the nature, the 
fate, and the status of the fetus."t2 She makes the point that even if 
we believe the woman should be informed in order to make the best 
moral judgment, it is not clear why medical practitioners should 
play this role, and why the requirements should not apply whenever 
a weighty decision is being made, such as the choice to use a scarce 
medical resource. She secondly considers responsibilities in preg-
nancy, such as the possible responsibility to refrain from drug use 
and smoking. Applying the "benefit-burden approach" of chapter 
five, she concludes that a woman refraining from abortion may be 
obliged to make some sacrifices for the good of the fetus, and that 
punitive measures might be appropriate if she refused. Finally, 
Kamm looks at the problems presented by the prospect of an artifi-
cial womb. She concludes that a woman refusing safe external ges-
tation might then be prohibited from aborting. 
Creation and Abortion thus attempts to argue that some abor-
tions would be permissible and that responsibilities in pregnancy 
would not be unlimited, even if the fetus were presumed to be a 
person. It does not attempt to draw the lines where one might with-
out granting the personhood premise. It also does not draw the 
lines where one could based on other arguments, such as the need to 
achieve gender equality.t3 One can thus be uncomfortable with a 
number of the lines drawn (and alternative approaches rejected) and 
still recognize that the book attempts the progressive task of locat-
ing possible points of agreement in the abortion debate. 
One must also admire the tenacity with which Kamm goes 
about that task. She has invented a multitude of ingenious cases, 
each presenting a slight variation of its predecessor, to expose the 
difference that small distinctions make. Kamm generally proceeds 
with rigor and inventiveness. 
12. Compare the Court's consideration of Pennsylvania's "informed consent" require-
ment in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
13. Kamm specifically rejects the adequacy of arguments for gender equality to demon-
strate that abortion should be permitted. She argues that the "thin conception of equality" 
that we might be able to require all to accept, that is, the need for political equality and equal 
civil liberties, would not require the availability of abortion. She also argues that moral 
equality is consistent with differences in responsibilities. 
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Let me nonetheless raise questions, first about Kamm's argu-
ment, taking it on its own terms. Indeed, Kamm repeatedly raises 
questions about the argument herself. Here I focus on one rather 
central concern: the repeated strategy of using preconception non-
existence as a base line in order to argue that the fetus may be 
aborted, in part because it is made no worse off than if it had never 
existed. 
This strategy is clearly of concern to Kamm as well. She takes 
pains to explore a number of the problems raised by using death as 
the base line in the violinist case and preconception nonexistence for 
the fetus. Yet after all of her work on this, it remains doubtful to 
me that someone who believed the fetus to be a person would find it 
plausible to use fetal nonexistence as the base line in assessing 
whether the aborted fetus is wronged. Comparisons to the violinist 
once he is dead (or perhaps to a respirator-dependent person after 
disconnection and death) do not seem to help much here. The vio-
linist did exist before attachment, albeit on a downward dying 
course. When the author invites us then to imagine the violinist 
dead, we know what she means: a specific imagined person is now 
dead. But trying to envision preconception nonexistence is a differ-
ent matter. As Kamm herself notes, there is no being who exists 
before conception. It is much less obvious what we are talking 
about.I4 
Kamm acknowledges these problems. She concedes that one 
cannot take the comparison to preconception nonexistence literally. 
Instead, she holds to the comparison "nonliterally." Yet that seems 
simply to put to one side the genuine problems posed by the strat-
egy. After all, as Kamm has constructed the project of her book, 
the question is not whether she herself can somehow imagine pre-
conception nonexistence taken "nonliterally." Instead, the question 
is whether someone who held the fetus to be a person would find the 
time before the person existed a plausible base line in determining 
whether later termination of that person's life was wrong. Unfortu-
nately, Kamm never explores whether there is an alternative strat-
egy that would work for those who remain unconvinced, while 
preserving the rest of her "output cutoff'' (or later, "abortion cut-
off'') argument. 
Stepping outside Kamm's argument, there are also limitations 
to her basic method. Is In particular, her appeal to intuitions, use of 
14. As Kamm indicates, this leads us into territory explored by Derek Parfit in Reasons 
and Persons (Clarendon Press, 1984). 
15. Assessment of Kamm's method may be somewhat hampered by the fact that she 
evidently presents it more fully in her forthcoming work, Morality, Mortality. As of the 
writing of this review, that work was not yet publicly available. Note that this review was 
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fantastic cases, and treatment of the law all merit comment. 
The main limitation of any argument based on an appeal to 
intuitions, of course, is that the argument loses its plausibility if you 
do not share the intuitions. As noted above, Kamm claims to be 
trying to demonstrate the mere plausibility of the arguments, not 
trying to convince us to believe them ourselves. Yet even persuad-
ing us of their plausibility may require that we concur in her intu-
itions to a great extent. 
Even if we do find those intuitions plausible, we have to won-
der whether the intuitions generated here provide good guidance in 
the real world of abortion. Kamm relies heavily upon invented 
cases, creating not only some that might be true in the world as we 
know it, but also others that presume a different world. The ques-
tion is whether this technique yields conclusions that are morally 
appropriate to guide human beings as we exist in this world. 
Kamm defends her approach, arguing that 
[t]he fact that these cases are hypothetical and often fantastic dis-
tinguishes this enterprise from straightforward applied ethics, in 
which the primary aim is to give definite answers to real-life di-
lemmas. Real-life cases often do not contain the relevant-or 
solely the relevant--characteristics to help in our search for 
principles. 
The problem is that abortion is a real-life dilemma. The adequacy 
of moral argument on the subject should ultimately have something 
to do with whether it applies to the real problem. A detour into 
fantastic hypotheticals can surely be useful to clarify our thinking. 
Yet reliance on such hypotheticals without further work to show 
how the insights gained apply in the real world raises concerns. 
When cases are stripped of their actual context, detail and messi-
ness, we may be losing much of what is morally important.'6 
Finally, we are left with the question of what all of this has to 
do with law. The relationship between morality and law is a pivotal 
question in the abortion debate. On that score, the book's subtitle is 
promising: "A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy." However, 
the discussion of law and legal philosophy is relatively sparse.11 
also written before publication of Ronald Dworkin's Life's Dominion: An Argument About 
Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). 
16. See generally Martha Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1597 (1990). 
17. As an indication of how limited the discussion of law itself is, the entire book cites 
only Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), at the Supreme Court level. Below that level, it cites 
two further cases: People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Municipal Ct., San Diego County, 
Feb 26, 1987), and In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). An exam-
ple of the book's generally cursory treatment of the law occurs in the discussion of punish-
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The Introduction states that moral permissibility is "ordinarily 
more demanding" than legal permissibility. Thus Kamm goes on to 
state that "[t]he moral discussion is relevant to the issue of legal 
permissibility insofar as the legal discussion . . . must mimic the 
moral discussion." Yet this cannot be her view of the relationship 
of morality and law in this debate. Her own discussion of the impli-
cations of liberalism suggest greater complexity. It would have 
been useful for the author to present and defend more systemati-
cally her notion of how law and legal philosophy relate to her moral 
arguments. 
Kamm's discussion of Roe itself is brief. Yet she does use Roe 
to set up the central question of whether the Court has to deny the 
fetus the status of a "person" in order to protect a woman's right to 
choose an abortion.Is Kamm's philosophical analysis suggests the 
answer may be no; at least some abortions could remain permissi-
ble. She does not pursue the point further, however, by considering 
exactly how her philosophical analysis might translate into law, or 
the Court's trajectory since Roe. 
We should take Kamm's book as what it is, then-not concen-
trated analysis of the law, full engagement with the realities of abor-
tion, or an argument that will persuade all of its truth or even 
plausibility. Rather it is an ingenious search for a coherent defense 
of the moral permissibility of many abortions, under the concilia-
tory assumption that the fetus is a person. In that sense, it is an 
impressive addition to a tradition Thomson pioneered, seeking com-
mon ground on extremely contested terrain. 
ment and prosecution for pregnant women engaged in behavior that may harm the fetus. The 
author neither cites nor addresses the now substantial literature raising questions about a 
punitive response. See, for example, Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have 
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1991); 
Lawrence J. Nelson and Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: 
Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060 (1988). 
18. For further discussion of this point, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of 
Absolutes 135 (W.W. Norton, 1990). 
